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Washington State Law

• State v. Prado, 145 Wn.App. 646; 186 P.3d 1186 (2008)  (The court ruled the stop of the defendant was invalid where he was stopped for crossing the fog line by two tire widths and for one second. The court also took into consideration the fact that no other traffic was present and no danger was posed to other vehicles.  Importantly, it appears (to Judges), the “lane violation” occurred during a curvature in the road and not a straight area).
• State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (Probable cause requires facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge which are sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed).
• State v. Feller, 60 Wn. App. 678 (1991) (A stop of a vehicle for a traffic violation and a detention of the driver for a brief investigation must conform to the due process standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio).
• State v. Quaring, 32 Wn. App. 728 (1982) (The officer must have enough information to warrant the intrusion, balancing the state’s law enforcement interest against the individual’s right to freedom from interference of movement).
• City of Seattle v. Yaeger, 67 Wn. App. 41 (1992) (RCW 46.16.710 authorizes a stop of any vehicle that has been “tagged” by a police officer indicating a driver has been without a valid license, for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the current driver is properly licensed).
• City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (A traffic stop is a "seizure" for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief).
• State v. Graham, 2007 WL 4574969 (officer did not have particular suspicion of wrongdoing which would justify stop based on an observation of the driver in a romantic position with passenger in a truck parked on the side of the road)
• Middleburg Heights v. Quinones, 2007 WL 2051994 (Weaving not a violation because statute only requires that driver maintain one lane as nearly as practicable and that before changing lanes a driver first ascertain that the lane change can be made safely)
• State v. St. Martin, 2007 WL 865860 (premature activation of high beams when passing a patrol vehicle does not justify a traffic stop under community caretaking principles)
• State v Burks, 114 Wn. App. 109 (2002) (which upheld the stop of a driver for a cracked windshield pursuant to RCW 46.37.010)
• State v. Phillips, 2006 WL 3477003 (crossing edge line does not constitute failure to obey traffic control devices)
• State v. Rincon, 2006 WL 3513133 (slow driving without more, does not create reasonable suspicion to stop for DUI)
• State v. Curtis, 2006 WL 3068812 (police lacked reasonable suspicion of traffic infraction or DUI where defendant weaved outside his lane three times over several hundred yards)
• Clarkston v. State, 63 Wn. App. 500 (1991) (fresh pursuit act only applies to felonies)
• Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982) (bad stop where motorist tells cop he sees drunk driver but police personally see no bad driving)
• Tennant v. Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305 (1986) (weaving within the lane)
• State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940 (1980)
• State v. Seiler, 95 Wn.2d. 43 (1982)
• State v. Campbell, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982)
• State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 564 (2003)
• State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003)
• State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash.2d 865, 869 514 P.2d 1069 (1973) (The stop of any motor vehicle must be valid and constitutional before we reach the issue of probable cause to arrest and reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor).
• Clement v. DOL, 109 Wn. App. 371, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001) (see Wetherell)
• Boker v. DOL, 74 Wn. App. 523 (1994) (Invocation of the implied consent law is predicated on a lawful arrest). 
• Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219 (1983) (A police officer may make investigatory stop for suspected drunk driving, but before doing so he must first possess a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that such a violation has been committed or is presently being committed.)
• City of Seattle v. Tolliver, 31 Wn. App. 299, 641 P.2d 719 (1982) (pulled over lawfully for green vine attached to bumper)
• State v. Martin, 106 Wn. App. 850, 25 P.3d 488 (2001), (“this court recently rejected arguments identical to those adopted by the superior court on RALJ appeal. In Martin, the court considered three cases in which police officers used information gained through a vehicle license number and DOL records to detain or investigate the defendants. Noting that the dissemination of licensing information to law enforcement officers was authorized by statute and that the records did not contain highly personal information, the court held that under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, drivers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their DOL records 'that precludes law enforcement officers from searching those records without an individualized suspicion of the driver's involvement in criminal activity.' Martin, 106 Wn. App. at 852. The court also held that the records check did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. Martin, 106 Wn. App. at 861.”)
• State v. Jackson, 121 Wn. App. 1066, Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 1206981,Wash.App. Div. 1,2004 (Even though laser readings suppressed, enough for stop)
• State v. O'Cain, 108 Wn. App 542 (2001) and State v. Sandholm, 96 Wn. App.846 (1999) (for a discussion of arresting officer reliance on a radio dispatch)
• State v. Thornton, 41 Wn. App. 506 (1985)
• State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 276, 120 P.3d 596 (2005) (distinguishes State v. Rankin no need for independent reason when car is parked)
• Tennant v. Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305 (1986).
• State v Brown, 119 Wn.App 473 ((2003) (not improper to enter highway from parking lot without using signals)
• O’Neill v. Dep’t of Licensing, 62 Wash.App. 112, 116, 813 P.2d 166 (1991),
• State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437 (1980); State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621 (1989); State v. Davis, 12 Wn. App. 32 (1974) (Just because the driving may be “odd” or “provoking” curiosity does not provide a basis for the stop, as long as the vehicle is being driven in a lawful manner).
• City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454 (1988) (Roadblocks are prohibited under Washington law)
• State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175 (1973) (Random stops for the purpose of checking for required permits are prohibited under Washington law – also see Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004)).
• Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn. 2d 141 (1998); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 573 (1989) (An officer may stop a vehicle based on probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction or a misdemeanor has been committed in his presence).
• State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642 (1981) (The “fellow officer rule” may supplement information the officer knows at the time of the stop or arrest as the standard for probable cause).
• State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702(Data transmitted by the DOL may be used to supplement information known by the officer to validate probable cause – unless it turns out to be erroneous).
• State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539 (1996) (The officer may not use information that he subsequently learns to validate an earlier arrest).
• State v. Bravo Ortega, 159 Wn. App. 889 (2011) (fellow officer rule)
• DOL v. Lewis, 157 Wn.2d 446 (2006) (RCW 9.73.090 requires police officers to inform drivers during a traffic stop that they are being recorded if the officer makes a sound recording)
•State v. Dudas, 52 Wn. App. 832 (1988) (used in DOL hearing decision)
•City of Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn.2d 141, 158, 949 P.2d 347 (1998) (A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has violated the traffic code).
•State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 398, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979); see also Campbell v. Dep't of Licensing, 31 Wn. App. 833, 835, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982) (an officer may make an investigatory stop, but before doing so must have a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that an offense has been committed or is presently being committed).
•State v. White, 76 Wn. App. 801, 805, 888 P.2d 169 (1995), aff'd on other grounds, 129 Wn.2d 105, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996) (Under the fellow officer rule, probable cause may be determined based on the information possessed by the police as a whole when they are acting in concert).
•State v. Chelly, 94 Wn.App. 254, 259, 970 P.2d 376 (YEAR) (A law enforcement officer may lawfully perform a traffic stop if he or she has "probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred").
• State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 199 P.3d 445  (2008) (The court of appeals rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli test and held that a totality of the circumstances should be applied to Terry stops based on information provided by citizen informants.  Informants tips may provide the information necessary to establish a reasonable suspicion, but it must have “indicia of reliability,” considering (1) whether the informant is reliable, (2) whether the information was obtained in a reliable fashion, and (3) whether the officers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip)
• State v. Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 626, 834 P2d 41 (1992) ("Police may conduct an investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity.")
• State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P2d 445 (1986) (A reasonable suspicion is the "substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur.")
• State v. Rowe, 63 Wn. App. 750, 753,63 Wn. App. 1009, 822 P.2d 290 (1991) ("The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the inception of the stop.")
• State v. Kennedy,107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P2d 445 (1986);State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243 (1975) (The totality of the circumstances test allows the court and police officers to consider several factors when deciding whether a Terry stop based on an informant's tip is allowable, such as the nature of the crime, the officer's experience, and whether the officer's own observations corroborate information from the informant)

9th Circuit Law

• State v. Pollman, 156 P.3d (2006) (unpublished) (defendant was seized without a reasonable suspicion when officer retained his driver's license based solely on defendant's admission to drinking a few beers and backup officer's uncorrobated representation that defendant had an odor of alcohol)
• State v Padilla, 119 Or App 27, 850 P2d 372 (Or 1993) ( If driver is in dedicated lane, no signal is required)
• United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (Officer’s mistaken belief that Baja California vehicle registration was misplaced on vehicle could not justify the stop)
• United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (Officer’s mistaken belief that Michigan requires two license plates on vehicle could not justify traffic stop where vehicle had only one plate)
• State v. Mathews, 884 P.2d 1224 (Or. 1994) (Court held that decriminalizing minor traffic stops, the legislature did not intend to change the probable cause standard applicable to stops for a traffic infraction).
• U.S. v. King, 244 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2001) (An officers’ mistake of law will not support probable cause).
• United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002).   Where an officer makes a traffic stop on objective facts that fail to constitute a violation, then there is a lack of reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.  “If an officer simply does not know the law, and makes a stop based on objective facts that cannot constitute a violation, his suspicions cannot be reasonable.  The chimera created by his imaginings cannot be used against the driver.” 

Miscellaneous State Law

• United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect and has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.  This reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch – also see Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)).
• State v. Pepin, 920 A.2d 1209 (2007) (Squealing tires did not justify traffic stop for road-racing or DUI)
• US v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439 (2002)
• State v. Moore, 120 P.3d 635 (2005)
• State v. Homles, 117 P.3d 360 (2005)
• State v. Potter, 119 P.3d 877 (2005)
• People v. Cordero, 358 Ill.App.3d 121 (Car leaving a parking lot at night not enough for a Terry stop)
• Powell v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1165 (2006) (Anonymous tip did not justify stop)
• Director of Revenue v. Reed, 184 S.W.3d 564 (2006) (Driving a car into a ditch is not accident for probable cause purposes)
• State v. Milotte, 95 Conn. App. 616 (2006) (Because the driver was not operating the vehicle in an erratic or dangerous manner or otherwise engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity and because there was no report of recent crime in the area, the officer lacked a particularized and objective factual basis to warrant an investigatory stop)
• State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818 (2004) (Officer’s wrong interpretation of traffic law not justify stop)
• State v. Robinson, 592 S.E.2d 733 (N.C.App. 2004) (delay of eight to ten seconds at traffic light not equal enough to stop for DUI)
• US v Lyons, 7 F3d 973 (10th Cir 1993
• People v Faletti, 573 NE2d 867 (Ill App 1991)
• State v Boley, --NW2d—(Iowa App 2004)(Driver made wide, but legal turn, then two miles of drifting, coming close to hitting curb twice)
• State v Brechler, 412 NW2d 367 (Minn App 1987)
• City of Mason v Loveless, 622 NE 2d 6 (Ohio App 1993)
• Salter v N. Dak. Dept. of Trans., 505 NW2d 11 (N.D. 1993) (While traveling 30-35 MPH in a 50 zone)
• State v Cerny, 972 SW2d 910 (Tex App 1998)
• Warrick v Commissioner, 374 NW2d 585 (Minn. App 1985)
• State v Tarvin, 972 SW2d 910 (Tex App 1998)
• State v Livingston, 75 P3d 1103 (Ariz App 2003)(Crossed fog line one time)
• Crooks v State, 710 So2d 1041 (Fla App 1998)
• State v Tague, 676 NW2d 197 Iowa 2004) (Crossed left edge line)
• State v Vaughn, 448 So2d 915 (La App 1984) (one six inch intrusion)
• Rowe v Maryland, 769 A2d 879 (Md. 2001)
• State v Caron, 534 A2d 978 (Me. 1987) (Straddled center line for 25-50 yards)
• State v Downs, –NE.2d—(OhioApp 2004) (single brief violation)
• Commonwealth v Garcia, --A2d –(Pa 2004) (Straddled center line for two blocks)
• Commonwealth v Chernosky, --A2d—(Pa 2004) (Drifted right, almost hitting telephone pole, crossed centerline more than twice, drifted from right to left, swerved within lane)
• State v Huddleston, --SW2d—(Tex App 2005) (Crossed fog line five times over five-to-six miles)
•US v Freeman, 209 F3d 464 (6th Cir. 2000)
• US v Miller, --F3d – (5th Cir 1998) (Defendant activated signal but neither turned nor changed lanes)
• State v Goodman, 220 Ga App 169 (1996) ( If the driver can only turn legally in one direction, a signal is not required)
• State v. Chatton, 463 N.E. 2d 1237 (Ohio 1984) (An officers’ mistake of law will not support probable cause).
• State v. Lovig, 657 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 2004); Norris v. State, 993 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1999); • Bismark v. Glass, 581 N.W.2d 474 (N.D. App. 1998) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s home)
• State v. Winkler, 552 N.W. 2d 347 (N.D. 1996) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s unenclosed front porch – also see State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688 (1993))
• People v. Stodeman, 606 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Just. Ct. 1993) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s garage).
• Megaard v. Comm. Of Public Safety, 500 N.W.2d 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s motor home).


US Supreme Court

• Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect and has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.  This reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch. The Terry standard was later extended to temporary detentions contacted in traffic stops).
• Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (A traffic stop is a "seizure" for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief).
• Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004) (Random stops for the purpose of checking for required permits are prohibited – case involved a roadblock set up in an attempt to gather evidence about a previously committed crime – also see State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175 (1973)).

Statutes/Rules

RCW 10.93 (Mutual Aid Peace Officers Act)

Constitution

Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution (seizure?)

Article I, Section 7, Washington Constitution (No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law)

PRETEXT STOPS

Washington State Law

• State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (The court adopted a strict no-pretext rule stating that “[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999)  (The court. Concluded that there is a constitutionally protected interest against warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a mere pretext to dispense with the warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement. Further, they held pretextual traffic stops violate article I, section 7, because they are seizures absent the "authority of law" which a warrant would bring. Const. art. I, § 7).
• State v. DeSantiago, 97 Wn. App. 446 (1999) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Rainey, 107 Wn. App. 129 (2001) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Myers, 119 Wn. App. 93 (2003) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968) ("Neither would this court have any hesitancy in suppressing evidence of crime found during the taking of the inventory, if we found that either the arrest or the impoundment of the vehicle was resorted to as a device and pretext for making a general exploratory search of the car without a search warrant.")
• State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (In Hehman the issue was whether a search incident-to-an-arrest for a minor traffic stop was valid. Hehman not only rejected the recent federal cases but reaffirmed the pretext rule in Washington and further held under state public policy minor traffic stops could not support an arrest at all because "`the risk of pretext arrests is heightened'")
• State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). (Hehman was "intended to lessen the risk of minor offenses being used for pretextual arrests”)
• State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)  (The court affirmed the pretext rule in the context of automobile inventory searches, holding for a warrantless inventory search to be valid where the driver was already in jail, "the State must demonstrate that the impoundment was lawful, and that the inventory search was proper and not a mere pretext for an investigatory search").
• State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143,  622 P.2d 1218 (1980) ("In sanctioning such a[n inventory] search, however, we recognize the possibility for abuse and have required that the State show that the search was conducted in good faith and not as a pretext for an investigatory search").
• State v. Angelos, 86 Wn. App. 253, 936 P.2d 52 (1997) (When determining whether a given stop is pretextual, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior).
• State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 917 P.2d 563 (1996);  State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) (It is already well established that article I, section 7, of the state constitution has broader application than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
• State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (quoting State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170,622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).Article I, section 7, of the Washington State Constitution is explicitly broader than that of the Fourth Amendment[fn1] as it "`clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations'" and places greater emphasis on privacy).
• State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) (While the Fourth Amendment operates on a downward ratcheting mechanism of diminishing expectations of privacy, article I, section 7, holds the line by pegging the constitutional standard to "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.")
• State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (Washington courts have adopted a strict no-pretext rule. "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775 (1932), and Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961))
• State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 385, 438 P.2d 571 (1968) ("Neither would this court have any hesitancy in suppressing evidence of crime found during the taking of the inventory, if we found that either the arrest or the impoundment of the vehicle was resorted to as a device and pretext for making a general exploratory search of the car without a search warrant - (citing State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962), and People v. Garrison, 189 Cal.App.2d 549,11 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1961))
• State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (The court reaffirmed the pretext rule in Washington and further held under state public policy minor traffic stops could not support an arrest at all because "`the risk of pretext arrests is heightened.'")
• State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).The ruling Hehman was "intended to lessen the risk of minor offenses being used for pretextual arrests.")
• State v. Angelos, 86 Wn. App. 253, 256, 936 P.2d 52 (1997) ("When the use of the emergency exception is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must satisfy itself that the claimed emergency was not simply a pretext for conducting an evidentiary search. To satisfy the exception, the State must show that the officer, both subjectively and objectively, `is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance.'" (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 489 (1982)).
• State v. Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 132-33, 542 P.2d 771 (1975) (An officer may examine the facts he knows in light of his own experience and expertise).
• State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) ("[W]e would not consider ourselves bound by a police officer's inability to articulate his conclusions if the facts clearly demonstrated the existence of probable cause.") 

9th Circuit Law

• Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• People v. Garrison, 189 Cal.App.2d 549, 11 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1961) (Police may not rely on a pretext to conduct a search or seizure).

Miscellaneous State Law

• United States v. Day, 455 F.2d 454, 456 (3d Cir. 1972); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) ("[W]e would not consider ourselves bound by a police officer's inability to articulate his conclusions if the facts clearly demonstrated the existence of probable cause." –also see State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 544 P.2d 786 (1975))

US Supreme Court

• United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775 (1932) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (Pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution – but see State v. Ladson, 133 Wn.2d 1028, 950 P.2d 476 (1998) and State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 917 P.2d 563 (1996)).
• Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973) (A search incident to a pretextual traffic arrest is valid even though admittedly pretextual see State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) which rejects this case)
• United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (The Supreme Court decided use of a "traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext for a narcotics search" is permissible under the Fourth Amendment so long as the motorist could have been arrested for the violation – see State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) which rejects this case).


Articles/Books/Treatise/Manuals

• Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment's Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1007, 1038 (1996). ("Pretext is, by definition, a false reason used to disguise a real motive. Thus, what is needed is a test that tests real motives. Motives are, by definition, subjective").
• David C. Anson, Note, Criminal Procedure Personal Search of Suspect Incident to Custodial Arrest Is Per Se "Reasonable"
• Sanford E. Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 Wn. L.Rev. 459, 508 (1986).
• 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(b)-(e) (1978) (An officer may examine the facts he knows in light of his own experience and expertise).

LAWFUL STOP - SPEEDING

Washington State Law

• Clement v. Dep't of Licensing, 109 Wn. App. 371, 376, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001) review denied, 146 Wn.2d 1017 (2002). (visual observations of motorist's car coupled with information that the radar showed car approaching at a speed in excess of the speed limit justifies traffic stop for speeding)
• City of Seattle v. Peterson 39 Wn. App. 524, 693 P.2d 757 (1985) (The court held that the lower court erred by taking judicial notice that the radar unit was reliable because the subject is not one of common knowledge.  Thus, the court required that a radar device be authenticated according to the Frye standard; that is, shown to be reliable before evidence of its results become admissible.)
• Bellevue v. Lightfoot, 75 Wn.App. 214, 877 P.2d 247 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1025 (1995); citing Peterson, 39 Wn.App. 524, and Bellevue v. Mociulski, 51 Wn.App. 855, 756 P.2d 1320, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1019 (1988). (The foundational requirements were further explained in the Bellevue v. Lightfoot case)
• Froemming v. Spokane City Lines, 71 Wn.2d 265 (1967); Golub v. Mantopoli, 65 Wn.2d 361 (1965); Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn.2d 702 (1964); Charlton v. Baker, 61 Wn.2d 369 (1963); Dunsmoort v. North Coast Transportation Co., 154 Wn. 229 (1929) (An officer's visual observation is not, by itself, sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was speeding).
• State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wn.App. 453, 970 P.2d 313 (1999) (the court required foundational support for an officer's opinion evidence on speed under either ER 701 or ER 702 in this case where the defendant attempted to elude police case)


Miscellaneous State Law

• Frye v. Unites State, 293 F. 2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
• Van Nort v. State, 250 Ga. App. 7, 550 S.E.2d 111 (2001); Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995); State v. Abeskaron, 326 N.J. Super. 110, 740 A.2d 690 (1999); City of Columbus v. Barton, 106 Ohio Misc.2d 17, 18, 733 N.E.2d 326 (1994) (`The laser speed detector is reliable and accurate as a scientific measure of the speed of a moving object, which can be used by law enforcement personnel to measure vehicle speed, provided that the device is used in accordance with certain procedures delineated by the manufacturer.')
• State v. Hiemstra, 6 Neb. App. 940, 579 N.W.2d 550 (1998) (holding that when testimony regarding a motorist's speed is used to establish a charge other than speeding, the officer's testimony need not be corroborated)
• Hennings v. State, 236 Ga. App. 473, 512 S.E.2d 357 (1999) (holding that where the defendant was convicted of DUI, after a traffic stop for speeding, the initial stop was valid because it was based on radio information received from a fellow officer who observed the defendant's car speeding and that the State was not required to present a foundation to support any radar evidence)
• Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836 (1988) (holding that the State's failure to produce the necessary foundation to support radar test results did not invalidate the defendants' convictions of trafficking in marijuana because the issue of speeding was before the court only on the issue of the legitimacy of the initial stop and not on the substantive offense of speeding)
• Cantrell v. State, 561 P.2d 973 (Okla. Cr. 1977) (affirming the defendant's conviction of assault and battery upon a police officer, committed after the defendant had been stopped for speeding, and holding that the radar evidence was admissible, without evidence showing the accuracy and reliability of the radar device, to show that the defendant had committed an offense in the presence of an officer on the date in question, not to show that the defendant was guilty of speeding).

Statutes/Rules

RCW 46.61.470. (Speed traps are illegal and defined in this RCW.  However, see exception to this rule in section “3” of this RCW)

COMMUNITY CARETAKING

Washington State Law

• State v. Chisolm, 39 Wn. App. 864 (1985) (Some stops can be justified by the “community caretaking function,” such as when an officer wishes to warn a driver about some impending peril).
• State v. Moore, 129 Wn. App. 870, 120 P.3d 635 (2005) (officer's warrantless stop of car registered to person listed as "missing/endangered," was reasonable under community caretaking exception to warrant requirement)
• State v. Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13 (1993) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621 (1989) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. Markgraf, 59 Wn. App. 509 (1990) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373 (2000) (To qualify under the emergency doctrine’s community caretaking function exception, police encounters must be completely divorced from a criminal investigation.  Community caretaking functions include “delivering emergency messages, giving directions, searching for lost children, assisting stranded motorists, and rendering first aid“).
• State v. Acrey, 148 Wash.2d 738 (2003) (Whether a stop incident to such functions is ‘reasonable’ requires balancing “the competing interest involved in lights of all surrounding facts and circumstances, particularly the individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the public’s interest in having the police perform a community caretaking function).

Miscellaneous State Law

• Barrett v. Comm., 435 S.E.2d 902 (Va. App. 1993); State v. Cryan, 727 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. 1999) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).

INFORMANTS

Washington State Law

• Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982); State v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797 (1997) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip-also see Florida v. J.L,. 529, U.S. 266 (2000)).
• State v. Davis, 12 Wn. App. 32 (1974) (“A police officer’s unfounded suspicion or hunch is not a legal basis … even for a momentary [intrusion]”).
• State v. Randall, 73 Wn. App. 225, 228-29, 868 P.2d 207 (1994)
• State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 199 P.3d 445 (2008) (The court of appeals rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli test and held that a totality of the circumstances should be applied to Terry stops based on information provided by citizen informants.  Informants tips may provide the information necessary to establish a reasonable suspicion, but it must have “indicia of reliability,” considering (1) whether the informant is reliable, (2) whether the information was obtained in a reliable fashion, and (3) whether the officers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip)

9th Circuit Law

• State v. Valdez, 561 P.2d 1006 (Ore. 1977) (“[An officer’s] instinct and experience cannot … form the entire basis for a reasonable suspicion” [for a stop]).

Miscellaneous State Law

• State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639 (Indiana App. 2002).  (An anonymous tip without specific details did not justify a stop).
• Parres v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, 75 S.W.3d 311 (Missouri 2002). The eyewitness told the police officer that he had observed a purple jeep driving erratically. The informant personally gave the information to the police officer. The court found the subsequent detention and arrest lawful.
• City of Pratt v. Stover, 32 P.3d 1143 (Kan. 2001). The informant gave her name and address along with a description of the car. The court upheld the detention and indicated that a citizen informant who leaves her name and address is presumed to be credible.
• Frette v. City of Springdale, 959 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1998). In this case the tipster identified himself and noted that he witnessed criminal activity. Subsequent observations by the police officer confirmed the tipster’s claims. As such, the detention was upheld.
• Commonwealth v. Butterfield, 691 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). Information from a known citizen was deemed reliable.
• State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. App. 1997). The court described the facts in this case as an example of an informant whose tip was considered highly reliable.
• State v. Goodrich, 683 N.E.2d 855 (Ohio App. 1996) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip, even when the tip is a radio dispatch from another officer unless shown that the officer making the transmission had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop).
• State v. Gaddy, 182 W 2d 64 (2004) (The information received by a non police agency such as the DOL is presumptively reliable when used for a stop).  

US Supreme Court

• Florida v. J.L,. 529, U.S. 266 (2000) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip – also see State v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797 (1997) and Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982)).
• Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509,12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964)
• Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969)

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Criminal law and DUI Defense is guided by Statute (Revised Code of Washington - RCW; Washington Administrative Code), the Constitution and Case Law. Cases that have been heard and adjudicated at appellate and Supreme Court level have significance in every driving under the influence case. This area of law is critical, complicated and evolving. The following is a long list of important cases in DUI law. The number of cases on this page is lengthy, so scroll down to find the area of DUI you wish to focus on. The cases relevant to that area of law will be listed.

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